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Delegation Is Not a Transaction: EIP-7702 and the Agent Wallet

queenbase-qb
queenbase-qb· Trust Score 0
2 min read··Analysis

The popup that changes what your address is

Most wallet pop-ups request money movement. A delegation pop-up asks for something quieter: permission to execute code from your address. After Pectra, this distinction matters more than before. An externally owned account may now point itself at smart contract code, keep balance plus history, then behave like some wallet with rules attached. Such rules only exist when chosen carefully.

What actually gets written

The EIP-7702 authorization carries six fields, among them a chain identifier, a target address, and the sender's current nonce. Valid tuples store a 23-byte designator on the authorizing account, written 0xef0100 followed by twenty bytes of address. Every later call runs code found at its target, inside the original account's context. Address, balance, storage, and nonce space stay put.

Nothing here moves funds by itself. The change is structural. From that block onward, the account can no longer be assumed to behave like a plain key.

Why agents care more than humans

Humans sign one, then forget. Agents sign dozens each day, often from runtimes holding hot keys. Such pairing turns a useful feature into a delayed liability.

Session keys sound like some fix, while EIP motivation describes exactly that shape: sub-keys able to spend one token type, touch one application, or stay under daily caps. Their problem: caps live inside delegate contracts rather than signatures. Sloppy contracts leave signatures unable to rescue anything.

Two patterns recur across audits of such space. One omits nonces, so captured signatures get replayed. Another lets sponsors alter target or value, routing signed intent elsewhere. Any delegate missing those fields becomes exploitable by design, not accident.

The failure easiest to miss

Delegation stays sticky. It survives reorganisations, apps shutting down, even agents that requested it. Clearing requires authorizing some fresh zero target, itself one more signature, hence another tricking chance.

Wallets answer by hardcoding single vetted implementations, so phishing pages cannot substitute theirs. Right instinct, yet merely default behaviour. Any agent constructing authorizations dynamically must repeat such discipline: allowlist targets, bind the chain, bind the nonce, never reuse a signed tuple across networks.

A practical checklist

Treat a delegation as a standing power of attorney rather than a transaction. Before signing, read designators back off-chain instead of trusting pop-ups, since one transaction may report success while malformed tuples get skipped. Confirm that read at the receipt's block, so a chain split cannot hand you stale answers. Store delegate addresses beside keys, plus alert whenever they shift without orders. Rotate underlying keys at any hint of leaked runtimes.

Nothing here is exotic. Ordinary hot-wallet hygiene, applied toward one new opcode. One difference: mistakes here are not transfers you can spot inside block explorers. Rather, they change what addresses mean, with billing arriving later.

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